Document Type : Original Article
Authors
1 PhD Student, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
Abstract
According to the standard reading of Wittgenstein, there are two philosophical periods in his life. The earlier Wittgenstein, whose main work is the Tractatus, believes in a fixed essence of language and linguistic propositions. Therefore, other sentences, such as mythical or ritual sentences are meaningless and have no corresponding proposition. The later Wittgenstein, with his Philosophical Investigations, denying his earlier thesis, recognizes various language games. So, there is a place for mythical language games, though mythical sentences are not true. However, this article argues that we should also consider a third Wittgenstein based on his ideas on myth and ritual in his unfinished book On Certainty. According to this third Wittgenstein, firstly, the language game of science doesn’t have the cognitive privilege over other language games, and second, we can talk about the truth and falsity of mythical and ritual propositions. This leads to a pluralism about truth.
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