John McDowell's Critique of Philippa Foot's Creative Naturalism

Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 PhD in Ethics, University of Qom, Qom, Iran

2 Associate Professor, Faculty of Theology, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran

10.30479/wp.2025.21127.1128

Abstract

In his critique of Philippa Foot's moral naturalism, John McDowell critically examines nature-based ethical approaches. Moral naturalism attempts to explain moral values and principles in terms of characteristics derived from human nature. Inspired by Aristotelian philosophy, Foot believes that moral values are rooted in the natural functioning of living beings and should not be considered in isolation from the natural world. He emphasizes the role of the specific function (organ) of man in the formation of moral values. McDowell, influenced by the Aristotelian moral tradition, also considers the origin of moral values to be rooted in human nature, with the difference that he does not overlook the role of human reason in shaping moral values. McDowell, by distinguishing between primary and secondary nature in humans, believes that moral values are rooted in human secondary nature, not human primary nature, as is implied by Foote's statement. McDowell takes a position between Kantian rationalism and Foote's extreme naturalism.

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Main Subjects

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