Document Type : Original Article

Authors

1 MA in Philosophy of Science, Mofid University, Qom, Iran

2 Professor, Department of Philosophy, Mofid University, Qom, Iran

Abstract

This article aims to carry out a critical study of certain deterministic approaches to the result of some of the neuroscience experiments, including the Libet experiment. In these experiments, the choices leading to action are investigated and demonstrated to originate from parts of the brain that are beyond our control and will. Following an explanation of the experiments, the paper offers a logical analysis of their results. Then, reasons are presented to criticize deterministic results based on Libet’s experiments. Among other things, it is shown that Libet's test and the results obtained from it are faced with the following problems: inappropriate generalization of the test and its results to all the conscious actions of people, non-spontaneity of the performance of the test subjects, lack of time accuracy, and unconscious intention. Finally, the paper shows that the results of neuroscience experiments are too ambiguous and cannot be used to reject free will.

Keywords

Main Subjects

Bargh, J. A. (1997) “The Automaticity of Everyday Life”, in The Automaticity of Everyday Life: Advances in Social Cognition, vol. 10, pp. 1-61, Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.##
Blackmore, S. (2005) Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction, New York: OUP Oxford.##
Churchland, P. M. (2013). Matter and Consciousness, 3rd ed., Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.##
Doyle, B. (2022). “Free Will in Antiquity”. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/ free_will_in_antiquity.htm##
Fischer, J. M.; Kane, R.; Pereboom, D. & Vargas, M. (2007) Four Views on Free Will, Malden: Blackwell Publishing.##
Harris, S. (2010) The Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values, New York: Free Press.##
Harris, S. (2012) Free Will, New York: Free Press.##
Hoefer, Carl (2024) “Causal Determinism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman; https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/determinism-causal.##
Kane, R. (2011) “Introduction: the Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates (Part 2)”, Oxford Handbook On Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.##
Klemm, W. R. (2010) “Free Will Debates: Simple Experiments Are not so Simple”, Advances in Cognitive Psychology, vol. 6, pp. 47-65; doi:10.2478/v10053-008-0073-5.##
Libet, B. (1999) “Do we have free will?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 6, no. 8-9, pp. 47-57.##
Libet, B.; Gleason, C. A.; Wright, E. W. & Pearl, D. K. (1983) “Time of Conscious Intention to Act in Relation to Onset of Cerebral Activity (readiness-potential). The Unconscious Initiation of a Freely Voluntary Act”, Brain: A Journal of Neurology, no. 106 (Pt3), pp. 623-642. doi:10.1093/brain/106.3.623.##
Lowe, E. J. (2004) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511801471.##
Mele, A. R. (2014) Free: Why Science Hasn't Disproved Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.##
Nahmias, E. A. (2002) “When Consciousness Matters: A Critical Review of Daniel Wegner's the Illusion of Conscious will”, Philosophical Psychology, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 527-541.##
Rice, Hugh (2024) “Fatalism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman; https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2024/entries/fatalism. ##
Robb, D. (2020) “Moral Responsibility and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/entries/alternative-possibilities.##
Schurger, A.; Mylopoulos, M. & Rosenthal, D. (2016) “Neural Antecedents of Spontaneous Voluntary Movement: A New Perspective”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 20, pp. 77-79; doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.11.003.##
Schurger, A.; Sitt, J. D. & Dehaene, S. (2012) “An Accumulator Model for Spontaneous Neural Activity prior to Self-initiated Movement”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 109, no. 42; doi:https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210467109.##
Shepherd, J. (2017) “Neuroscientific Threats to Free Will”, in K. Timpe, M. Griffiths & N. Levy (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Free Will, Vol. 37, pp. 2-12, London and New York: Routledge.##
Smith, K. (2011) “Neuroscience vs Philosophy: Taking Aim at Free Will”, Nature, vol. 477, no. 7362, pp. 23-25; doi:10.1038/477023a.##
Wegner, D. & Wheatley, T. (1999) “Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of the Experience of Will”, The American Psychologist, no. 54, pp. 480-492. doi:10.1037//0003-066X.54.7.480.##
Wegner, D. M. (2002) The Illusion of Conscious Will, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.##
Wilson, T. D. (2002) Strangers to Ourselves Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious, Cambridge & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. doi:10.2307/j.ctvjghvsk.##