Document Type : Original Article
Author
PhD Student in Moral Philosophy, University of Qom, Qom, Iran.
Abstract
The concept of “moral certainties” has attracted much attention in the past few decades. Although this concept has a long history and has been used in various fields, in the last three decades, Wittgenstein's approach has become essential, and many philosophers look at it with Wittgenstein's approach. But Sophie Grace Chappell, an American philosopher, made a new plan and had a completely different view of this concept, independent and far from Wittgenstein's ideas. What Chappell means by “moral certainties” are propositions that bring certainty that no other dubious proposition can confront and doubt. Any reason given to doubt a proposition like "killing is wrong" would engage in a credibility contest and lose credibility. According to Chappell, the only thing that can eliminate one moral certainty is another moral certainty, and in this situation, the only solution to the conflict will be to abandon one of them. Propositions of “moral certainty” are not natural or innate. For this reason, in order to start moral education, we must be able to acquire new moral certainties and even put aside some of them that we have acquired before. In this article, we are going to explore this concept through Chappell's independent approach and show what are their characteristics, what is their difference with moral intuitions, and why other moral theories do not have the function of these moral certainties.
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