Document Type : Original Article
Author
PhD in Philosophy, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
Abstract
When philosophers and jurists of the natural law school talk about human rights, they consider them to be rights derived from human nature. Philosophers such as Richard Rorty have taken a deconstructive approach to the nature and universal truth about human beings, criticizing essentialism and fundamentalism in human rights with skepticism. Instead, with a historical and pragmatic approach, they dismiss the philosophical approach as a universal foundation for human rights and argue that fundamental rationalist projects such as the concept of human rights if Make no mistake, they are unnecessary and outdated. Rorty believes that at any time and place, a kind of legal discourse is formed for each society and is accepted as a legal principle by a consensus in the same society. Therefore, it would be futile to impose a universal and equal law as human rights on all societies. According to him, there is no transcendent human nature by which we seek to justify our beliefs. What brings us together is not human rationality but common historical contexts. Therefore, the best way to promote a culture of human rights is through our shared sad experiences, in order to lead people towards respect for human rights and a sense of empathy. Human rights here are not rational and metaphysical but constructive in the interests of humanity. Our attempt in this article is to answer such doubts: Can Rorty's irrational sentimentalism be able to distinguish between true and false human rights stories? How is his thought possible and explicable? On the other hand, is the classical theory of human rights, that is, the theory that defines human rights based on the common interests of the people, an unsuitable basis for understanding human rights in international relations? Is deconstruction the general principles of morality, is it not immoral and the negation of morality?
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