Document Type : Original Article
Author
Assistant Professor, Department of Education, Farhangian University, Hakim Ferdowsi Campus, Alborz, Iran.
Abstract
One of Heidegger's major citations in explaining the process of forgetting Being in the history of metaphysics is the lack of attention paid to ontological differentiation by metaphysical companions, according to which one should avoid reducing Being to a particular being. According to Heidegger, due to the lack of attention to ontological differentiation throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have often neglected a careful study of the "meaning" and "truth" of Being. But as we know, one of the clever considerations of Muslim philosophers is to pay attention to the distinction between Being and quiddity. Serious attention to this distinction, which is first reflected in Farabi's philosophical views, has become one of the main foundations of ontology for Avicenna. The fundamental question here is whether the distinction between Being and quiddity and related issues can be considered by Muslim philosophers, especially Avicenna, as an example of Heidegger's desirable ontological differentiation. The results show that in Avicenna's intellectual system, Being is considered as an object; In such a way that even in mental analysis, the latter is considered to be what a being is and is not considered as a component of its identity. This way of dealing with the problem of Being, in addition to ignoring the question of the meaning and truth of Being, forgets it as a presence, ambiguity, and opening horizon and thus refuses to pay attention to Heidegger's desirable ontological differentiation.
Keywords
)